

OBRAZLOŽENJE PREDLOGA DA SE PROFESORU TIMOTI VILIJAMSONU DODELI TITULA POČASNOG DOKTORA UNIVERZITETA U BEOGRADU

Od 2000. godine, Profesor Timoti Vilijamson (Timothy Williamson) član je New College-a u zvanju Wykeham Professor of Logic na Oksfordskom univerzitetu. Njegov istraživački rad tiče se pre svega filozofske logike, epistemologije, metafizike i filozofije jezika.

Biografija

Profesor Vilijamson je rođen 1955. godine u Upsali u Švedskoj. Osnovne studije matematike i filozofije kao i master i doktorske studije iz filozofije završio je na Oksfordskom univerzitetu. Nakon toga, pre nego što je stekao sadašnje zvanje u Oksfordu, bio je predavač filozofije na koledžu Trinitu u Dablinu, tutor na Univerzitetskom koledžu u Oksfordu i profesor logike i metafizike na Edinburškom univerzitetu. Pored toga, bio je gostujući profesor na MIT-u i u Princetonu, stipendista Australijskog nacionalnog univerziteta i Univerziteta Kanterberi (Novi Zeland), Nelson distinguished professor na Univerzitetu Mičigen, An Arbor i Townsend Visitor na Kalifornijskom univerzitetu u Berkliju. Trenutno je gostujući profesor na univerzitetu Jejl. Održao je čitav niz predavanja u velikim univerzitetskim centrima u Americi, Evropi, Aziji, Australiji i Africi.

Profesor Vilijamson je bio predsednik Aristotelovskog društva (Aristotelian Society) i Društva Mind (Mind Association) i potpredsednik Britanskog logičkog kolokvijuma. Član je Britanske akademije i Kraljevskog društva u Edinburgu, spoljni član Norveške akademije nauke i književnosti, član Academia Europaea, počasni član Kraljevske irske akademije, spoljni počasni član Američke akademije umetnosti i nauka, kao i počasni član koledža Baliol u Oksfordu.

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Imajući u vidu njihov veliki broj, ovde nema mesta za to da se navedu sva izdanja prevoda Vilijamsonovih monografija, u celini ili delimično, kao i prevoda njegovih drugih radova.

Članci i delovi monografija

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Saradnja sa filozofskom zajednicom u Srbiji

Profesor Timoti Vilijamson je počeo da posećuje Srbiju još početkom osamdesetih godina prošlog veka (1982). Njegova saradnja sa našom filozofskom i naučnom zajednicom traje kontinuirano tri i po decenije. Bio je gost Matematičkog instituta SANU i Srpskog filozofskog društva, ali daleko najplodotvorniju saradnju ostvario je sa Odeljenjem za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu, na kome je održavao predavanja i u vreme sankcija devedesetih godina prošlog veka. Zajedno s Dejvidom Čarlsom iz Oksforda i Aleksandrom Pavkovićem iz Beograda, ondašnjim docentom na Odeljenju za filozofiju, osnovao je, još 1982. godine, međunarodni Septembarski filozofski kurs (čiji je današnji naziv *Mind, World and Action*) u Međunarodnom centru za post-diplomske studije u Dubrovniku, koji se, uz nešto više od deset godina prekida devedesetih godina i kratko potom, neprekidno, do danas, održava (u 21. veku na čelu sa Prof. Milošem Arsenijevićem iz Beograda, Prof. Majdom Trobok iz Rijeke i Prof. Timoti Vilijamsonom kao ko-direktorima.) Na tom kursu učesvovalo je više desetina članova Odeljenja za filozofiju našeg fakulteta, kako u svojstvu predavača tako i studenata.

Osim toga što skoro da nema godine u kojoj Timoti Vilijamson (bez ikakve naknade troškova s beogradske strane) nije održao na našem fakultetu ili u Srpskom filozofskom društvu bar jedno predavanje, on se rado odazivao na pozive da učestvuje na filozofskim konferencijama u organizaciji Odeljenja za filozofiju (poput međunarodne konferencije ‘Modal Epistemology and Metaphysics’, Beograd, Filozofski fakultet, 18-20. septembar 2014. godine, ili memorijalne

konferencije posvećene Nikoli Graheku, 2007). Pritom je i sam posredovao kod poznatih svetskih filozofa da uzmu učešća na njima. S druge pak strane, više poseta naših kolega Velikoj Britaniji, Miloša Arsenijevića i Sandre Šćepanović Oksfordu u svojstvu predavača, Miroslave Trajkovski (tada Anđelković) Edinburgu (s kojom je objavio zajednički tekst –videti Bibliografiju) i Andreja Jandrića Oksfordu u svojstvu stipendista, ostvareno je zalaganjem Timoti Vilijamsona.

Više Vilijamsonovih tekstova objavljeno je na srpskom jeziku (videti Bibliografiju). Dodatno se njegov doprinos našoj filozofskoj publicistici sastoji u podsticaju višegodišnjem nastojanju da *Filozofski godišnjak*, časopis Instituta za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta, preraste u međunarodni časopis *Belgrade Philosophical Annual* (u kome je već objavljeno više tekstova vrhunskih svetskih filozofa i koji očekujemo da već ove godine bude stavljen na AHCI listu), a u kome je Timoti Vilijamson član uređivačkog odbora i u kome je i sam objavio tekst (videti Bibliografiju).

Zaključak

Na osnovu svega navedenog, možemo reći da nam predstavlja čast i zadovoljstvo da predložimo da se profesoru Timoti Vilijamsonu, jednom od svetski najuglednijih filozofa, kako zbog njegovog doprinosa filozofiji tako i izuzetno značajnoj saradnji sa srpskim filozofima, a pre svega sa Odeljenjem za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu, dodeli zvanje Počasnog doktora (*Doctor Honoris Causa*) Univerziteta u Beogradu.